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The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism by which a particular 
innovation came about at a particular point in time. The case to be analyzed is the 
technological innovation of automotive emission control in the 1970s. Why did 
Japanese automakers, who still lagged in technological capabilities at the time behind 
their U.S. and European competitors, develop the three-way catalytic converter system 
in 1977 - at a time earlier than widely expected within the industry? This is the question 
we will address empirically. 
The timing of technological innovation is one of the critical issues to better 
understand innovation, both theoretically and practically. As Rosenberg (1969) and 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) pointed out, without determining the forces that pushed 
exploratory activities of a particular technology at a specific time, i.e., not earlier or 
later, our understanding of the mechanisms behind technological changes would not be 
satisfactory. The advent of a dominant design has a profound effect on innovation 
activities and industrial competition (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Where network 
externalities exist, late-comers with superior technologies would hardly replace the 
first-comers with their entrenched customer base (David, 1985; Arthur, 1992). The 
timing at which a new technology takes place thus has decisive consequences for 
managers. 
With the aim to explain the timing of a particular innovation, this paper builds on 
the “social construction of technology (SCOT)” perspective proposed by Bijker (1995) 
and Pinch & Bijker (1987). We particularly draw on two basic viewpoints from the 
SCOT perspective: the “interpretative flexibility” approach and “symmetrical analysis” 
approach. The latter takes both successful and unsuccessful technologies into account 
symmetrically, while the former pays attention to different interpretations of an artifact 
by different relevant social groups. Our case analysis will show that the dominant   2
emission control technology (three-way catalytic converter system) was realized earlier 
than expected because the development of the technology was prompted through the 
social and political processes among different social groups, mobilized by an 
unsuccessful technology (CVCC engine). We demonstrate that the SCOT perspective 
could be applied to explain the timing of technological innovation.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
research agenda, arguing why the timing of a particular innovation is an important issue 
to understand technological change. In Section 3, our analytical viewpoints to 
understand the issue of timing in the context of the “social construction of technology” 
perspective are presented. Section 4 introduces the case material and defines our 
empirical question. Section 5 traces historically, based on the analytical viewpoints, how 
the three-way catalytic converter system was developed. Section 6 describes the 
mechanism we have found behind the historical developments. Finally, in Section 7, 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Research Agenda 
Why did a particular innovation come about at a particular point in time? This is a 
critical question for innovation research, as Rosenberg (1969) and Mowery and 
Rosenberg (1979) repeatedly emphasized in their critical reviews of innovation studies.   
Some scholars explain that technological innovations are realized by economic 
incentives to save money, such as labor and capital costs, or by responding to the market 
demands. Yet, such explanations are problematic since all of these economic incentives 
and needs are so pervasive and general. Economic incentive, per se, cannot explain 
particular directions and timing of technological changes.
1  Other students proposed that 
the innovation process consists of several stages such as: (1) the recognition of the 
potential and its technical feasibility, (2) the idea formulation stage to create a design 
concept, and (3) the problem solving stage leading to a testable item. However, nowhere 
does this argument provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what determines the 
time lag between these stages. Why does a particular innovation take a long time from 
the recognition stage to the conceptualization, whereas another moves within a short 
period of time? Unless we can determine the time lag, the explanation has limited value 
to understand the mechanism of a technological change. Rosenberg and Mowery argued, 
if we cannot explain the timing, how dare we claim to understand technological 
                                                 
1  For example, in order to explain why the development of the telephone was realized in the mid 
19th century, it is not sufficient to say that it was because people wanted to communicate. The need 
to communicate with others had existed for centuries. 
   3
innovations?  
Timing is also an important issue for practitioners, if we recognize that the 
emergence of a particular technology can have irreversible effects on the industry and 
competition. For example, a dominant design divides the industry evolution (Abernathy 
and Utterback, 1978). With the advent of a dominant design, the focus of innovation 
shifts from product to process. Since the emergence of a dominant design significantly 
alters the competitive landscape, those who bet on other technologies and cannot catch 
up with the change may lose competitive advantage and even go out of business. 
Therefore, managers desperately need to know which technology is emerging as the 
dominant design at a particular time. 
Similarly, in a world where network externalities and increasing returns are 
important, once a particular technology becomes a dominant standard, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for later technologies to replace the standard one, no matter how 
superior it might be (David,1985; Arthur, 1992). Where path-dependency matters, the 
timing in which a particular technology is realized can have lasting effects on the future 
of society. 
If we stand on the assumption of technological determinism, in which the superior 
technology prevails and shapes our society, or if we treat technological changes as a 
series of random events or as an outcome driven by the unpredictable imagination of 
individual genius, then the timing of technological change wouldn’t deserve attention in 
our research efforts. At a given place and a given time, a superior technology is 
developed and prevails in the society as a superior option. Firms are advised to 
concentrate on the perceived superior technologies and governments are supposed to 
support these technologies (Liebowits and Margolis, 1990). 
However, if the advent of a dominant technological innovation is 
socially-embedded in both its causes and consequences, then an attempt to explore the 
mechanisms by which a particular technology comes about at a particular point in time 




3. Analytical Viewpoints 
A clue to our inquiry as to the timing of innovation can be found in Tushman and 
Rosenkopf (1992). Among a variety of factors affecting technological changes, they 
                                                 
2  Although we assume that technology is embedded within the society, we don’t mean that society 
shapes technology unilaterally, as we will make clear later in the paper. Our assumption is that 
technology doesn’t progress autonomously. Technology cannot escape the influence of society.           4
suggested that not only technological and economic factors, but also social and political 
factors play important roles, especially in the process of the emergence of a dominant 
design. Once the dominant design emerges, product functions and configurations are 
mostly determined and critical technical problems are defined. Subsequent changes in 
the technology are likely to take a rational path, both technically and economically 
(Dosi, 1982). In the era of ferment, however, uncertainty prevails. Multiple choices of 
different technologies remain and there is no well-established standard to evaluate these 
choices. Therefore, although technological possibilities may be contingent on the 
technological logic, the choice among the possibilities would be largely influenced by 
social and political factors. 
Given the substantial importance of socio-political factors, how should we analyze 
the process more in-depth? A promising hint for further investigation comes from two 
viewpoints designed for the social construction of technology (SCOT) perspective, 
suggested by Pinch and Bijker (1987) and Bijker (1995): “interpretive flexibility,” and 
“symmetrical analysis” approaches. The former focuses on different interpretations 
taken by different “relevant social groups,” each of which sees and interprets a 
particular artifact differently with its own set of problems. The latter takes both 
successful and unsuccessful technologies into account in the same framework 
symmetrically. These two viewpoints, which underpin the SCOT perspective, consider 
technological change and its acceptance not as an intrinsic property of the artifact, but 
subject to interactions among relevant social groups, each of which have different 
interpretations of the artifact. They attempt to overcome the limitation of functional 
explanations and technological determinism, which assume that an artifact succeeded 
because it worked well technologically, while others failed because they simply didn’t 
work well.   
So far, however, the SCOT approach has been applied to such research issues as 
the success or failure of a technology, evaluation criteria for a technology, and 
directions of technological changes. To the best of our knowedge, it has not been 
applied to the issue of timing. In this paper, we attempt to demonstrate that the SCOT 
perspective is valuable in understanding the timing of technological innovation. By 
comparison, Rosenberg (1969), who emphasized the importance of understanding the 
timing of a particular technological change, indicated one mechanism to define the 
timing of technological changes - an imbalance within a technological system as a 
means of focusing innovation. When one part of a system improves its performance 
substantially, it requires other parts in the system to improve so that the integrated 
system realizes the potential benefits. This is a mechanism where an intrinsic property   5
(e.g., interdependency) of the technological system defines the timing (Kato, 1999). By 
contrast, our goal in this paper is to present a set of empirical evidence to demonstrate 
that the “timing” issue can be addressed effectively by the two SCOT viewpoints. 
 
4. The Empirical Field and Previous Studies     
4.1. The Empirical Field 
The field for our empirical investigation is the historical development of the 
automotive emission control system in the 1970s. This is a case where a dominant 
technology appeared unexpectedly early, thus providing a useful subject to examine the 
timing of technological innovation. 
It was in 1977 that Japanese automakers, who lagged behind their US and 
European competitors in technological prowess, came to develop the three-way catalytic 
converter system to meet the most stringent emission-control standards in the world. 
This was an achievement that was believed to be impossible in the mid-1970s. The 
three-way catalytic converter system is a device to significantly reduce the amount of 
three types of pollutants: hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of 
nitrogen (NOx) from emissions. After thirty years, this technology still remains as the 
dominant emission control technology for gasoline engines in the world auto industry. It 
is also arguable that this technological achievement gave the Japanese auto industry the 
impetus for subsequent competitive momentum. 
However, in 1973 (just four years before the development of the technology), at a 
hearing of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), major automobile 
manufactures of the world, including the Big Three, asserted that the catalytic converter 
system was premature and far from completion and requested that the enforcement of 
the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendment (CAA) be suspended. The 1970 CAA was proposed 
by Senator Muskie and enacted in December 1970 (in Japan, this 1970 CAA is well 
known as the Muskie Laws). The act specified a 90% reduction in the level of HC and 
CO emissions from the 1970 levels by Model Year (MY) 1975, followed by a 90% 
reduction of NOx from the 1971 level by MY 1976. It was a very stringent 
environmental regulation, requiring that HC, CO, and NOx all would have to be 
reduced by 90% of the prior standard less than six years. 
Given the necessary lead time to go from technological development to mass 
production, less than three years was available to develop new emission controls for 
automakers as of December 1970, when the 1970 CAA was enacted. While most 
automakers paid serious attention to catalytic converter devices as a possible solution, 
they believed that it would take much longer to develop reliable catalytic converter   6
systems to be applied for a wide variety of engines. Asserting that the timeline to 
completion of three years was unfeasible, major automakers waged concerted lobbing 
efforts at Congress and EPA for postponement, sometimes appealing to the courts. 
The catalytic converter technology was also criticized as “most disadvantageous 
with respect to cost, fuel economy, maintainability, and durability” by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), one of the most notable scientific organizations in the U.S. 
In its report in 1973, NAS concluded that the provisions of the 1970 CAA were unlikely 
to be attained on the established schedule and would even harm the industry’s ability to 
develop better solutions. Finally, recognizing that it would be imperative to suspend the 
original 1975/1976 timetable after the hearing in 1973, EPA granted a one-year 
postponement to the 1975 standard and declared a 1975 interim standard. 
Subsequently, as further amendments to the 1970 CAA and reviews by EPA 
continued, implementation of the original 1970 CAA was suspended repeatedly and the 
standards were relaxed frequently. Throughout these years, resistance from the industry 
was vehement. In 1976, for example, Mr. Estes, President of General Motors at the time, 
expressed his views during an interview with the New York Times: “They [the Federal 
Government] can close the plants, put someone in jail, maybe me, but we’re going to 
make [1978] cars to 1977 standards.” Ultimately, the original 1970 CAA standards were 
first achieved in California in 1981 and not nationwide until 1994.
3 
However, it was June 1977, just eight months after Mr. Estes statement that the 
three-way catalytic converter system was realized and installed in new models in Japan 
by Japanese automakers. Why was the most stringent emission control standard enacted 
and met successfully in Japan, leaving the U.S. far behind, despite the fact that the U.S. 
was initially far ahead in policy formation as well as technological capabilities for 
emission control? This is the question for our case analysis. 
 
4.2. Previous Studies: Three Explanations 
Previous studies on this topic have pointed out three major reasons why Japan was 
a pioneer in this remarkable technological innovation in automobile emission control.   
First, an OECD report emphasized the role of the Japanese government (OECD, 
1977). In contrast with successive delays in the U.S. regulations, the Japanese 
government rejected automaker’s request for suspension and implemented the most 
stringent NOx standard of 0.25 g/km beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1978. The report 
asserted that it was the strict environmental policy adhered to by the Japanese 
government that triggered the innovative activities of the industry.   
                                                 
3  The EU introduced in 1992 the emission control equivalent to that of the U.S.     7
Second, two studies (Miyashita and Takeuchi, 1982; Mutou, 1984) suggested that 
the market structure in the Japanese automobile industry made a difference. Differing 
from the oligopoly structure of the U.S. automobile market where the Big Three 
dominated, the Japanese market structure was more competitive in that nine automakers, 
including small ones, were intensively competing with each other. According to these 
studies, it was the healthy competition between automakers that stimulated the 
technological innovation. Particularly important was the role of Honda. Differentiating 
itself from leading Japanese automakers, which focused their engineering efforts on 
catalytic converter technologies, Honda, the late-comer to the industry in Japan, focused 
on engine modifications and developed the CVCC engine in 1972. As the first 
technology to have successfully passed the test of the 1975 standard of the original 1970 
CAA, the CVCC engine drew much attention as a possible solution to emission control. 
The CVCC engine had its limitations to comply with ever more stringent standards, and 
the final solution was provided by the three-way catalytic converter system developed 
by Toyota and Nissan. Nevertheless, these studies pointed out that competitive pressure 
from small makers prompted major manufacturers to work much harder. 
Third, another study emphasized that the social movement outside the industry 
played an important role (Kajita, 1988). In this view, it was the left-wing municipal 
governments that played a key role by politically demanding the conservative Japanese 
government to push hard for strict emission control, which the industry had expected to 
be postponed, as in the case of the U.S. 
These explanations provide us with important factors (government regulation, 
competition, social movement) behind the unexpected timing of the development of the 
catalytic converter system in 1977. In particular, the first explanation gives us a direct 
answer to the research question of this paper. It was the Japanese government’s 
imposition of the NOx reduction regulation from FY 1978 that compelled the Japanese 
auto industry to come up with the technological solution in 1977. There is no doubt as 
to the important role of the Japanese government, but a question still remains: why were 
the strict emission control standards, which had been judged unfeasible and thus 
postponed in the U.S., maintained and implemented in Japan? The first explanation does 
not provide a satisfactory answer to this question.
4 Neither of the other two 
explanations addressed the timing of the technological innovation directly and our 
research question is still left unexplained. Building on these previous studies, this paper 
aims at providing a new explanation of the particular timing of the innovation. As will 
                                                 
4  Indeed, OECD (1977) was astonished that the Japanese government enacted the most stringent 
NOx standard, despite strong protests from automobile manufacturers.     8
be revealed later, the three explanations will be combined in our analysis. 
 
5. Process towards the Innovation 
Having defined our empirical question, we now move to our case description. 
Based on the analytical viewpoints, we trace the socio-political process toward the 
development of the three-way catalytic converter in 1977, taking both successful and 
unsuccessful technologies into account and paying attention to different interpretations 
of emission control technologies by various social groups
5. The case draws on historical 
archives and interviews with those engineers involved in the technology development in 
the 1970s. 
 
5.1. Emission Control in Japan 
Shortly after the U.S. Congress passed the 1970 CAA in 1970, the Japanese 
government formed the Environment Agency (EA; now Ministry of the Environment) 
and set emission control standards in 1972 that were equivalent to those of the US. The 
standards in the original plan required the 90% reduction of HC and CO emissions by 
FY 1975, and 90% reductions of NOx, which was more difficult to achieve, by FY 1976. 
It meant that emissions of HC, CO, and NOx should be reduced to 2.1, 0.25 and 0.25 
g/km, respectively, less than four years. 
As in the U.S., Japanese automakers asserted that it would be technologically 
unfeasible to achieve these standards, especially the NOx reduction, within a short 
period of time and demanded a suspension. However, unlike in the U.S., where the 
standards were delayed and relaxed year by year, in Japan the government decided at 
the end of 1974 to set an interim reduction of NOx to 0.6 g/km for FY 1976, and then 
enforced a full 90% reduction to 0.25 g/km from FY 1978, constituting the most 
stringent emission control in the world. As we have already mentioned, a direct reason 
for the development of the three-way catalytic converter system in 1977 is due to the 
enactment of the 1978 NOx standards. However, we would like to go further in our 
analysis. What we would like to know is why, in the first place, such a stringent 
emission standard was enacted in Japan. For this investigation, we pay special attention 
to the role played by Honda’s CVCC engine in the process toward the government’s 
decision.  
 
5.2. CVCC and Its Evaluation 
Whereas major automakers in the world put their resources to develop catalytic 
                                                 
5  The table in the Appendix provides a brief history of the case.   9
converter technologies, Honda sought for a different technological solution. Honda 
focused on engine modification, and came up with the CVCC (Compound Vortex 
Controlled Combustion) engine.   
A catalytic converter receives exhaust from an engine and reduces the pollutants 
through chemical processes. In contrast, CVCC modifies the conventional engine to 
achieve a lean-burning system. For gasoline internal combustion engines, the three 
pollutants (CO, HO and NOx) exhibit trade-off relations near the ideal fuel-air ratio 
(15:1), which is the best combination of gasoline and air for power and fuel economy. In 
order to reduce the three pollutants simultaneously from combustion, a lean-burning 
system is required, with a fuel-air ratio of 20:1. Usually the combustion process is 
unstable and slow in a lean-burning system. In the system of CVCC, however, Honda 
developed a dual-chamber, in which a fuel-rich mixture was admitted to the small 
chamber, while a fuel-lean mixture was admitted to the main chamber. Therefore, the 
burning jet issuing from the small chamber after the spark plug discharge ensured good 
ignition of the very lean mixture in the main chamber. 
A reason why Honda probed the engine modification (CVCC engine) approach 
lied within the engineering philosophy of Mr. Honda, the founder of the company. He 
strongly believed that emission should be cleaned up at the source, that is, in the 
combustion process, rather than by any additional devices such as catalytic converters. 
There were other reasons. Honda trailed other automakers in catalytic converter 
technologies and was more willing to modify its engines because they were a small 
automaker with few small car models at the time. The amount of investment necessary 
for engine modification was not large compared with larger automakers with a wide 
variety of engines. Furthermore, Honda, which was a late-comer in the Japanese auto 
industry, suffered serious damage from recalls of its main model, N 360, in 1969. Honda 
considered the development of the CVCC as a great opportunity to restore and gain its 
reputation in Japan and abroad. 
In 1972, at an EPA hearing in the U.S., Honda testified that CVCC engine would 
be able to pass the 1975 emission levels (0.41 and 3.4 grams per mile for HC and CO). 
In December of that year, the CVCC engine indeed passed the EPA certification for the 
first time in the world and drew much attention internationally. NAS immediately 
published a report that praised the CVCC engine highly and suggested that other 
manufacturers also implement this solution (NAS, 1973). 
Yet, in the end, the CVCC engine did not prevail as a dominant technology. CVCC 
had serious drawbacks in fuel economy and engine power. In order to overcome such a 
weakness, Honda made great engineering efforts, but the CVCC barely passed the EPA   10
test for the 1975 emission standards with delicate adjustments, fine-tuned for the test 
with its small-sized engine. In contrast to Honda, which manufactured only small-sized 
cars at the time, the CVCC couldn’t be an effective solution for other leading 
automakers. Since the other auto makers manufactured a wide variety of cars with 
several different engine sizes, it was much more risky and expensive for them to put the 
new engine technology into mass production within the required timeframe. 
Furthermore, it was even more difficult for the CVCC engine to meet the original 1976 
emission standards in which not only HC and CO but also NOx should have been 
reduced by 90%
6. 
Although initially the CVCC engine was in the spotlight as a seemingly promising 
solution to emission control, the perception that it could not be a viable solution for the 
auto industry eventually prevailed. Nor were catalytic converter systems seen as viable 
within a foreseeable future. Leading automakers in both the U.S. and Japan commonly 
viewed that 1970 CAA should be postponed
7. This was why the original 1975/1976 
standards had been suspended several times in the U.S., as we have seen. The situation 
in Japan, however, unfolded differently. 
 
5.3. Left-Wing Forces and Social Pressure 
In June 1974, the Environmental Agency gave a hearing to Japanese automakers 
on the technological feasibility of 90% reduction of NOx, which was scheduled to start 
two years later in FY 1976. Major automakers testified that the standards would be 
technologically unfeasible and requested a relaxation and suspension. In contrast, 
Honda suggested an interim standard for NOx reduction because unconditional 
postponement would deny the opportunity for the company to showcase its new low- 
emission engine. While major automakers insisted on their claims, the CVCC engine 
was increasingly covered by the Japanese mass media. Eventually, left-wing municipal 
governments, which had been heavily involved in anti-population activities, began to 
pay a great deal of attention to the CVCC engine. 
Two months after the hearing, in August 1974, governors from the seven largest 
                                                 
6  For a report that pointed out the CVCC’s weakness, see Grad et al (1974). Since the CVCC engine 
could not reduce NOx by 90%, Honda later added thermal reactors for NOx reduction. CVCC’s 
limitation was also recognized by Toyota. Toyota asked Honda for the license of the CVCC 
technologies in 1972 and developed an engine model based on Honda’s license in 1975. In 1976, 
Toyota then developed its original lean-burn combustion engine (TGP). Due to its limitation, 
however, Toyota discontinued the production of these engines after one year. 
7  Similarly, Mazda developed the rotary engine, which was another promising solution to the 
emission control, but because of its weakness in fuel economy, this technology could not succeed 
either.      11
cites, including Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kawasaki 
convened and declared their “statement to promote the emission control.” At the time, 
these largest cities in Japan were all under the control of the left-wing forces. For those 
cities, automotive pollution was one of the major issues to fight with the 
Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) in the central government. Because photochemical 
smog increasingly aggravated metropolitan residents and automotive emissions were 
indicated as the major contributor, emission control was a decisive policy issue for the 
governors on which there could be no compromise. The statement criticized 
automakers’ philosophy of maximizing profits without consideration of public health, 
stating, “the automakers should make their maximum effort to accomplish the emission 
standards.” The seven cities then established a committee to investigate and evaluate 
Japanese automakers’ efforts on emission control.     
The committee held a hearing in September and questioned automakers about 
technological possibilities. Toyota and Nissan asserted that the 1976 NOx standards 
should not be executed without confirming the reliability and safety of the catalytic 
converter system. The committee members argued that since potential solutions like the 
CVCC and rotary engines had been already developed, and both Toyota and Nissan had 
been developing similar technologies, the interim standard based on Honda’s proposal 
should be attainable
8.  
The committee report issued in October avowed that “the 1976 NOx standard, or 
the approximate to the original one, is fully attainable, and since the CVCC engine 
needs only one year to get ready for mass production, the prospect to meet the original 
emission control standards within the planned timeframe is convincing.” The report 
stated, “technological advancement is possible only under strong pressures from the 
government,” intending to restrict major automakers’ efforts to postpone the regulation. 
The committee hearing and the report fueled coverage from the mass media, and citizen 
activities in anti-pollution spread throughout the country
9. Large automakers were 
denounced for their lack of efforts and faced harsh public criticism.
10. 
                                                 
8  One member in the investigation committee noted, “Japanese top two makers were incomparably 
larger than Honda and Mazda not only in the sales but also in their manpower. It is suspicious to 
believe that they could achieve only 1.0～1.1 g/km of NOx [Honda proposed an 0.6g/km for an 
interim standard].” 
9  In the Asahi Shimbun, a leading newspaper in Japan, the number of articles on emission control 
reached about 150 per year during 1974 to 1975, when the debate on the regulation was heating up. 
It was about 20 in the late 1960s, and 50 in the early 1970s. 
10  Eiji Toyota, President of Toyota Motor at the time, recalled, “Since the final target of NOx of 
0.25 g/km was unlikely to be attainable within the timeframe, we suggested an extension. But I was 
called to the Diet and unjustly accused. It was an ordeal. Also, the mass media denounced us, saying 
“stop quibbling, just make our air clean.” Attacks from outside the industry were savage. The media   12
 
5.4. A New Prime Minister and Policy Decision 
While the pressure continued from the local governments, supported by citizens, 
to preserve the original regulation and press coverage on the issue further heated up, the 
Central Council for Environmental Pollution Control (Central Council, hereafter), an 
important formal council to recommend environmental policies to the government, 
submitted an interim report early in December 1974. The report admitted that 
enforcement of the 0.25 g/km NOx standards that were to go into effect in 1976 was 
probably impossible, and suggested a provisional standard of 0.6 g/km for the year. The 
report vaguely stated that it was not yet possible to predict when the final target 
(0.25g/km) would be met, thereby hinting at additional extensions in the future.   
Yet, harsh criticism to the central government’s environmental policy from the 
local governments and aggressive mass media didn’t fade away at all. Grumbling voices, 
demanding a reexamination of the Central Council’s interim report, were mounting. It 
was at this juncture, with great national tension, that the political landscape changed 
suddenly and significantly in the central government.   
On December 10, 1974, Kakuei Tanaka resigned as Prime Minister because of his 
money scandal, and Takeo Miki took over and formed a new cabinet. This happened 
just four days after the Central Council issued the interim report. Shortly after taking 
office, opposition parties blamed Miki in the Diet for relaxed environmental policies. 
Miki stated that his cabinet would make efforts to supervise automakers in order to 
shorten the lead time to achieve the standards. Miki was a former Director General of 
the Environmental Agency in the Tanaka cabinet, but resigned in the middle of 1974 
because of his political opposition to Tanaka. As a new Prime Minister, Miki was 
pushing “cleanness” as his cabinet’s slogan to differentiate himself from Tanaka and 
save the LDP. Emission control naturally became one of the most critical issues to test 
the will and commitment of Miki. As public concern on the issue was growing, he could 
hardly back away from it. 
After Miki ordered “deliberate reconsideration,” the Central Council held a special 
meeting on December 27 and made the final decision on the much debated issue of 
whether any suspension was needed or not. The final recommendation, which was 
reached by breaking down some strong opposition in the council, was very different 
from that of the interim report issued just three weeks prior. It declared unambiguously 
that efforts must be made to meet the final target of 0.25 g/km level in FY 1978. It 
                                                                                                                                               
accused us, “It is suspicious that the Japanese top maker, Toyota, cannot do what Honda and Mazda 
say they can do” (Toyota, 1985).   13
stated that the provisional standard of 0.6 g/km would last no more than two years after 
FY 1976. It was in this manner that the most stringent NOx standard in the world was 
determined to go into effect definitively in FY 1978 in Japan.   
With no chance of further suspension, automakers were forced to develop 
immediately the catalytic converter system to meet the standards. They poured 
significant resources and engineers into the development of emission control, putting 
aside other projects, including new model development. Intense efforts continued 
without success
11 until both Toyota and Nissan succeeded in developing the three-way 
catalytic converter system in 1977. Toyota’s new model with the system passed the 
certification testing for the 1978 emission standards by the Ministry of Transportation in 
February 1977, and Toyota started selling the model in June 1977. A month later, Nissan 
also started selling a new model with a three-way catalytic converter system that met the 
standards. To reiterate, this breakthrough was achieved less than one year since GM’s 
Estes denied the technological feasibility of meeting the 1970 CAA standards in the 
U.S.  
 
6. The Mechanism to Prompt the Development of Three-way Catalytic Converters 
Drawing on our analytical viewpoints, we have traced the process by which the 
three-way catalytic converter system was developed unexpectedly earlier in Japan. As 
depicted in Figure 1, an unsuccessful technology (CVCC engine), which was interpreted 
differently by different social groups (Honda, major automakers, left-wing municipal 
governments, citizens, the mass media, politicians, and bureaucrats), mobilized 
socio-political processes (opposition between the LDP and left-wing forces, overt 
anti-pollution movements, political stances of Miki to differentiate him from Tanaka). 
These processes intensified social and political pressures to prevent the most stringent 
emission controls from further suspension. Under the firmly-fixed timetable, the 
development of the dominant (successful) technology (the three-way catalytic converter 
system) was prompted and completed in 1977, earlier than widely expected. To 
summarize, the result reveals a mechanism that determines the timing of technological 
innovation  ─ an unsuccessful technology prompts the development of a successful 
one and it is realized at a particular point in time through socio-political processes 
                                                 
11“We worked seven days a week from early morning till midnight. Due to the overtime work every 
day I usually got home the next morning. Quite a lot of engineers involved in the painstaking 
development and test works burst themselves. Some of them, even today, still keep going to the 
hospital,” said Kiroku, Shimura, a former project manager of Engine System Development Division 
at Toyota (interviewed by the authors on December 14, 2000). 
   14
among various relevant social groups, each of which interprets the technologies 
differently.  
As Bijker (1995) indicated earlier, the success or failure of a particular technology 
may not be evaluated on an objective criterion. Especially in the “fluid phase”, in which 
the appropriate configuration of the technology is not commonly shared and the 
evaluation criteria are not well established, a wide range of interpretations are possible 
(Table 1). Engineers of major automakers and some bureaucrats interpreted the CVCC 
engine was an unsuitable solution for emission control technology, in particular, to 
satisfy the goal of reducing by 90% the levels of NOx within a few years and the 
development of catalytic converter systems would require much longer than originally 
planned. But their interpretation was not shared unanimously. As for the CVCC engine, 
an unsuccessful technology that was destined to fade way in the end, not only Honda 
but also left-wing forces, environmental activists, and some of the mass media 
interpreted it as a positive solution. This interpretation served as the motivation to 
stimulate the socio-political pressure against postponement and, in effect, prompted the 
development of the dominant emission control technology (the three-way catalytic 
converter system)
 12. 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies indicated that three factors played 
important roles in the process: government regulation, competition, and social 
movement. For this paper’s stated purpose to explain the particular timing of 
technological innovation, we have shown that all of these factors were indeed important 
(Fig.1). The CVCC engine, which stemmed from the “competition,” inspired the 
“socio-political movement” of the left-wing local governments and accidentally 
coincided with a significant change in the political climate in the central government, 
with the government deciding to enforce the stringent “regulation,” despite strong 
resistance from major automakers. 
What we have found intriguing in the process is that, in hindsight, every group 
was wrong in their evaluation. Major automakers’ assertion (and NAS’s report and 
EPA’s evaluation as well) regarding technological unfeasibility was defeated in the end. 
Honda’s bet on the CVCC engine was also lost. The argument by left-wing local 
governments and some mass media that the CVCC engine provided the evidence for 
                                                 
12  It seems that the CVCC engine made little impact on policy making in the U.S. But it does not 
necessarily mean that the technology was more objectively and accurately evaluated in the U.S. One 
may argue that President Nixon was supportive of automakers’ desire for the postponement. The 
EPA first rejected the Big Three’s request for postponement in 1972, but quickly changed its 
decision and granted a one-year suspension in 1973, shortly after Nixon’s reelection. Also, changes 
in political priorities from emission control to fuel economy after the first oil shock in 1973 might 
have affected the U.S. policy on emission control.   15
technological feasibility of the stringent emission control was without merit. It reveals 
how difficult it is to properly evaluate and forecast technological development before a 
dominant design emerges.
13 Indeed it was the difficulty of ex ante evaluation of 
technologies that allowed multiple interpretations and unexpectedly prompted the 
development of the three-way catalytic converter. 
To eliminate misunderstanding, we would like to emphasize the importance of 
technology. This paper does not insist that the development was prompted only by 
socio-political factors. The three-way catalytic converter could not have been realized 
until automakers could develop the technology that met the standards in a commercially 
viable way. The technology was not developed hastily after chances for further 
regulatory suspension disappeared at the end of 1974. Toyota, for example, started R&D 
on catalytic converters during the latter half of the 1960s. Also, in order to have the 
three-way catalytic converter work effectively, very precise control of fuel injection was 
crucial. Without technological progress in the mid 1970s in O2 sensors, which detect the 
oxygen density in the exhaust gas, and electronic fuel injection systems, the three-way 
catalytic converter system would not have been realized.
14 Just as Mr. Estes stated 
correctly, however stringent the regulation might be, it would be meaningless unless the 
technology to meet the regulations  was  available.     
This paper doesn’t intend to deny the value of the CVCC engine, either. As Honda 
itself shifted to a catalytic converter system later, the CVCC engine only existed as a 
short-lived technology and couldn’t become a dominant design. Yet, it was a remarkable 
innovation that met the 1975 standards for the first time. The CVCC engine could drive 
the social-political process, and eventually prompted the development of the three-way 
catalytic converter system within a short period
15 because it was a superior, although 
limited in hindsight, technology. Again, in this sense, technology was an important 
                                                 
13  Although the evaluation and forecasting was incorrect, the result was desirable to each group. 
Both central and local governments in Japan could enforce the most stringent, yet technologically 
feasible, emission standards and improved air quality and public health. Toyota and Nissan could 
develop the three-way catalytic converter system for the first time in the world, a great experience 
for these companies that would subsequently lead to their further success in the world’s auto 
industry. Also, Honda could gain a reputation for its technological capability with the CVCC engine, 
and then could continue to succeed by shifting from the CVCC engine to the three-way catalytic 
converter  later.            
14  To draw an overall picture of how the three-way catalytic converter was developed in 1977, we 
need to look inside the automakers. However, since this paper focuses on the role of socio-political 
factors, and also because of limited space, we chose not to. For details of technological 
development from the late 1960’s to 1977, see Zhu (2002). 
15  On a popular Japanese TV program [Project X] (July of 2000), the CVCC engine was highly 
praised as a historical innovation. Although the production of CVCC engines discontinued after 
1980, it was a sensational technology in the 1970s. If the CVCC engine had been less successful, 
the subsequent social movement would not have been continued.   16
driver. Technology is embedded within society, but society cannot be mobilized without 
technology.          
We are not arguing that inferior technology survived because of socio-political 
factors. Since most automakers considered catalytic converters as the best choice for 
emission control technology, the advent of the catalytic converter system as a dominant 
emission control technology would be most probable in the end, although perhaps not as 
soon as it actually occurred
16. Nor do we argue that socio-political factors affected the 
direction of technology development or the evaluation criteria for technologies. We 




This paper is grounded on the SCOT perspective. If the advent of a dominant 
technology is embedded within the social context, both in the reason for its emergence, 
as well as in its consequences, exploring why a particular innovation came about at a 
particular point in time deserves research, for which social factors should be taken into 
account. This is the premise of our paper and the conclusion of our analysis. 
In this paper, we have demonstrated the value of the SCOT perspective in 
understanding the timing of a technological innovation. While the viewpoints of 
“interpretative flexibility” and “symmetrical analysis” were both proposed by Bijker 
and his colleagues, this paper is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to apply these 
viewpoints to understand the timing of technological change. This paper has 
demonstrated that there could be a mechanism wherein the timing of a technological 
innovation is affected by socio-political interactions among various social groups, each 
of which have different interpretations on successful and unsuccessful technologies.   
The mechanism presented here shows that an “unsuccessful technology” can have 
a significant influence on the timing of the emergence of a “successful technology”. We 
think this indicates another value for “symmetrical analysis” in innovation research. 
17 
More generally, this identifies a pattern of interactions between technology and society 
in which a technology can dictate the timing of the development of another technology 
                                                 
16  It would be interesting to think of what could have happened if the emission control had also 
been postponed in Japan. If latecomers face difficulty taking over the leader due to, for example, 
“learning by doing” (Arthur, 1992), the realization of the three-way catalytic converter might have 
eliminated chances for other technological solutions to emerge. 
17  Based on “symmetrical analysis”, Bijker (1995) explained the technological change in bicycles 
from ordinary to safety-oriented in the late 19th century. But his explanation left the possibility that 
the safety-oriented bicycles became successful because all relevant social groups found them 
superior.    17
via the socio-political processes.     
Obviously the mechanism we have presented is one of a host of possible 
mechanisms, not a general framework to determine the timing of technological change. 
We need to explore other mechanisms and determine the conditions under which each 
mechanism works in determining the timing. More research with different empirical 
conditions is necessary.
18 Also, although this paper has focused just on the issue of 
timing, it would be interesting to deal with both the timing and the substances (possible 
choices, evaluation criterion, and the directions of changes) of technological changes 
together in an integrative manner.
 19 
If the mechanism we have proposed has some external validity, there could be 
some managerial implications. Policy-makers who are designing a regulation that 
requires new technologies, or managers who are wrestling with incongruous 
technological innovations, should realize that under some circumstances, technological 
changes may not necessarily unfold around an objective evaluation. 
Porter (1980) argued that the essence of formulating competitive strategy is 
relating a company to its environment. He then wrote, “Although the relevant 
environment is very broad, encompassing social as well as economic forces, the key 
aspect of the firm’s environment is the industry or industries in which it competes.” This 
argument seems valid if the technology is more or less stable. However, as our case 
suggests, in the era of technological change, in which uncertainty and ambiguity 
surround the industry, it would be important to pay close attention to social forces 
outside the industry. A technology that is seemingly inferior in eyes of most engineers 
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Table 1.    Relevant Social Groups and their Interpretation of   
Emission Control Technologies (as of mid- to late-1974) 
 








Improper solution through 




Limited solution; infeasible to 
reduce NOx by 90% to the   
original target of 0.25 g/km; 
ineffective for large-sized cars 
  
Best solution but takes longer time 
to be commercialized 
Left-wing   
local governments, 
citizen movement, 
the mass media 
(some)   
Superior solution for emission 
control, which is one of the most 
important issues for citizens. 
 










Has some potential  Hard to achieve, but the regulation 
schedule should be maintained by 
all means 
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